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Belief in 'Crude Reality';
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
By C. L. Sulzberger. New York Times (1857-Current file). New York,
N.Y.: Apr 22, 1973. p. 177 (1 page)
Tehran—Iran today finds itself wedged
between two of the world’s tensest crisis areas. To the west lies Iraq,
with which it is on very bad terms, and the festering middle East, already
riven [ripen?] by wars. To the east lies Pakistan, which shows signs of
coming apart.
Therefore Shah Mohammad Reza is implacably building up his national
military establishment to achieve a capability of self-defense against
anyone in non-nuclear war. “That is my ultimate aim,” he says. “Some
people laughed when I started off this program. But now I estimate we are
only about five years away from our goal.” The big switch is substitution
of self-reliance for dependence on outside aid. “We can’t rely on foreign
intervention to help us against aggression,” the Shah comments. “After
all, why should any country defend another that is unable to defend
itself? One must make one’s own struggle.”
The Shah no longer places faith in alliances. He says CENTO, which links
Iran with Turkey, Pakistan and Britain plus an indirect American tie, “was
never a reality. It was always just a club where people could talk
pleasantly. It had no tangible value.” Likewise, he holds no great brief
for the U.S. bilateral accord arranged with President Eisenhower. This
guaranteed Iran against a Communist threat. But, as the Shah says, “The
United States has the privilege of interpreting what ‘Communist’ meant, no
matter what we called it. Moreover, it was not an automatic defense
pledge.
“Officially that accord still exist; it hasn’t been denounced. But I don’t
really believe in pacts. I prefer to believe in crude reality and in the
paramountcy of national interests. Our relations with America are the same
with or without the pact because the United States cannot afford to see
anything happen to Iran.” What he means, of course, is that Washington
doesn’t want Russian dynamism to explode into the Indian Ocean and that
American industry cannot afford to risk seeing this land’s oil reservoir
cut off. That is the “crude reality” on which the Shah bets. I asked what
had been the effect on this strategic concept of both the Nixon Doctrine
and the new great power alignment. None, he said. He added: “I developed
my own doctrine of a strong Iran fourteen years ago. Nixon understands
that there is no protection than by itself.
“As for the new power alignment: we don’t mind it. We are sure you will
never do a dirty deal behind our backs. Anyway, you can’t afford to.” The
Shah says he has been insisting for years on heavy investment in Iran’s
military buildup even “against the better judgment of our good American
friends who thought that with two air-borne divisions the United States
could police the world.” The annual defense budget now approaches the
$2-billion level and huge amounts of U.S. supersonic aircraft,
helicopters, cargo planes, anti-aircraft missiles and British tanks were
on order. This trend was accelerated after the 1971 war between India and
Pakistan. The Shah says: “We saw organized armies crossing international
boundaries and nobody did anything about it, not even the United States,
while the mass media for the most part applauded this illegality. I
opposed Pakistan’s military intervention in Bangladesh. But the
India-Pakistan war more than ever reinforced our resolve to strengthen
Iran’s defenses.”
The problems today
facing Iran are seen as linked. Iraq is consistently hostile and
encourages subversion among Arab groups along the Persian Gulf. Moreover,
Baghdad Radio seeks to foment trouble among the Baluchis of both
southeast Iran and southwest Pakistan. Iran never forgets that Iraq
leans heavily on Moscow for support. The primordial problem, as the Shah
sees it, is to prevent West Pakistan from wholly falling apart. He is
urging India to help the shaky Pakistani
Government control autonomist movements in the northwest frontier and
Baluchistan provinces. He explains:
“If Pakistan disintegrates another Vietnam situation could develop. We
must see to it that Pakistan doesn’t fall to pieces. This would produce a
terrible mess, an Indochina situation of new and larger dimensions. I
dared to think of it.” And if it came anyway, if Pakistan fell apart? “The
least we could do in our own interest would be some kind of protective
reaction in Baluchistan.” What does that mean? Apparently to seize it
before anyone else does. An other “crude reality.”
Source: New York Times
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